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SEARCHING FOR CULPABILITY, PUNISHING THE 
GUILTY, AND PROTECTING THE INNOCENT: 
SHOULD CONGRESS LOOK TO THE MODEL PENAL 
CODE TO STEM THE TIDE OF FEDERAL 
OVERCRIMINALIZATION? 
David Dailey+ 
Wade Martin, a resident of Sitka, Alaska, received a jarring visit from state 
police.1  Martin had been charged with violating the Marine Mammal Protection 
Act and pled guilty because, according to his lawyer, the government would not 
be required to prove that he had any criminal intent when making the sale.2  The 
federal Marine Mammal Protection Act allows coastal Native Alaskans to trap 
and hunt certain protected species and sell them to fellow natives, an exemption 
that is not provided for any other group.3  Martin, a native coastal Alaskan 
familiar with the requirements of this particular federal statute, sold ten sea otters 
to someone he believed was a native, but who was actually a non-native.4  Martin 
was fined $1,000 and sentenced to two years probation.5   Despite Martin’s 
innocent mistake and the fact that the government did not need to prove that 
Martin intended to break the law, he was now a convicted criminal. 
                                                        
 + J.D., May 2015, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A., 2007, The 
American University.  The author wishes to thank Ron LeGrand for his valuable comments, insight, 
and guidance.  The author also wishes to thank the staff and editors of the Catholic University Law 
Review for their time and tremendous effort preparing this Comment for publication.  Finally, the 
author wishes to dedicate this Comment to the memory of his late father, David M. Dailey, who 
instilled in him his strong work ethic, and whose memory and love will always be a source of 
strength. 
 1. Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Federal Crime List Grows, Threshold of Guilt 
Declines, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904060 
604576570801651620000.html. 
 2. Id.  The relevant penalty states: 
Any person who knowingly violates any provision of this subchapter or of any permit or 
regulation issued thereunder (except as provided in section 1387 of this title) shall, upon 
conviction, be fined not more than $20,000 for each such violation, or imprisoned for not 
more than one year, or both. 
16 U.S.C. § 1375(b) (2012). 
 3. Fields & Emshwiller, supra note 1.  Specifically, the exemption provides: “That any 
edible portion of marine mammals may be sold in native villages and towns in Alaska or for native 
consumption.”  16 U.S.C. § 1371(b)(2). 
 4. Fields & Emshwiller, supra note 1.  The law requires covered mammals sold to non-
natives be converted into handicrafts first.  16 U.S.C. § 1371(b)(2). 
 5. Fields & Emshwiller, supra note 1. 
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The two basic elements of a crime are actus reus and mens rea.6  However, 
strict liability offenses and general welfare offenses remove the government’s 
burden to prove mens rea, which means a culpable or morally blameworthy state 
of mind.7  Fundamentally, the mens rea required for common law offenses—
murder, rape, robbery, burglary, trespass, and conversion of property—are 
widely known and, generally, considered to be accepted by society.8   State 
legislatures have codified these common law offenses and, even where the 
statutes are silent with regards to the requisite intent, courts routinely infer that 
the common law intent to these crimes remains intact.9 
At the federal level, a similar approach is applied when Congress codifies a 
typical common law offense but fails to include a specific intent element.10  
However, state legislatures and Congress have increasingly enacted criminal 
offense statutes that are not found in the common law.11  It is estimated that there 
are at minimum 4,450 offenses at the federal level that carry a criminal penalty12 
and at least 10,000 (and maybe as many as 300,000) federal regulations that also 
carry criminal sanctions.13  Several states have adopted the Model Penal Code’s 
                                                        
 6. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 127 (5th ed. 2009) 
(explaining that actus reus is the physical action of the crime, while mens rea is the mental 
component). 
 7. Id. at 176–77. 
 8. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251–52 (1952) (recognizing intent as a 
fundamental component of a criminal offense). 
 9. Id. at 252. 
 10. Id. at 262. 
 11. JAMES A. STRAZZELLA, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON 
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 7–10 (1998), 
available at  http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminaljustice/Federaliz 
ation_of_Criminal_Law.authcheckdam.pdf.  The report commented that Congress is limited by the 
Constitution in making conduct a federal crime and generally, Congress may only criminalize 
activities in the following three areas: (1) conduct that “interfere[s] with the core functions of the 
federal government” (for example, treason, controlling national borders, and protecting government 
currency); (2) “[l]egislation essentially based on a federal relationship to the site of the crime” (such 
as crimes that take place “on the high seas,” or “apply[ing] standards for certain federal lands and 
American Indian reservations,” and other areas “where only the federal government can effectively 
legislate”); and  (3) “criminaliz[ing] [] conduct on a Commerce Clause basis.”  Id. at 45–46. 
 12. John S. Barker, Revisiting the Explosive Growth of Federal Crimes, HERITAGE FOUND., 
June 26, 2008, http://www.heritage.org/Research/LegalIssues/lm26.cfm.  According to a recent 
study by the Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress, between 2008 and 2013, 
439 new criminal offenses were added to the United States Code, averaging almost 89 new criminal 
offenses a year.  Memorandum from Alison M. Smith, Legislative Attorney, Cong. Research Serv., 
& Richard M. Thompson II, Legislative Attorney, Cong. Research Serv., to Crime, Terrorism, 
Homeland Security & Investigations Subcommittee (H. Judiciary) (June 23, 2014). 
 13. See STRAZZELLA, supra note 11, at 10 (discussing criminal sanctions included within 
federal regulations); see also Barker, supra note 12 (juxtaposing the various statistics regarding 
federal regulations that carry criminal penalties).  In prepared testimony before the House Judiciary 
Committee’s Overcriminalization Taskforce, Steven Benjamin, the President of the National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, cited a report by the Department of Justice Office of 
Legal Education that stated “that ‘a majority of [federal] offenses fail to protect the innocent with 
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(MPC) default mens rea provisions to address overcriminalization at the state 
level—but no similar provision exists at the federal level.14  Numerous journal 
articles have been written on the topic of overcriminalization at the federal 
level.15  Organizations, including the American Bar Association, the Heritage 
Foundation, and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, have 
called on Congress to address the issue of overcriminalization.16 
Congress may finally be heeding the calls for reform.  On May 7, 2013, the 
House Committee on the Judiciary established a bipartisan task force to study 
the issue of overcriminalization at the federal level and to propose remedies.17  
Advocates for reform at the federal level have advanced several specific 
recommendations including enacting default mens rea rules similar to the MPC, 
codifying the common law rule of lenity, requiring sequential referral to the 
House and the Senate Judiciary Committees of any bill that would create new or 
modify existing criminal offenses or penalties, and requiring Congress to include 
accompanying reports explaining the justification, costs, and benefits of any new 
criminal offense or penalty proposed.18 
                                                        
adequate mens rea requirements, [and] many of them are so vague, far-reaching, and imprecise that 
few lawyers, much less non-lawyers, could determine what specific conduct they prohibit and 
punish.’”  Defining the Problem and Scope of Over-criminalization and Over-federalization: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Over-Criminalization Task Force, 113th Cong. 7 
(2013) (written statement of Steven D. Benjamin, President of the National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers) (quoting BRIAN W. WALSH & TIFFANY M. JOSLYN, WITHOUT INTENT: HOW 
CONGRESS IS ERODING THE CRIMINAL INTENT REQUIREMENT IN FEDERAL LAW X (2010), 
available at http://www.nacdl.org/criminaldefense.aspx?id=10287&terms=withoutintent) 
http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/113th/06142013/Benjamin%2006142013.pdf.  Norman 
Reimer, the Executive Director of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers pointed 
out that “Congress frequently turns hundreds, even thousands, of administrative and civil 
regulations into strict liability criminal offenses by enacting just one law that criminalizes ‘knowing 
violations’ of said regulations or provides blanket regulatory authority enforceable with criminal 
penalties.”  Mens Rea: The Need for a Meaningful Intent Requirement in Federal Criminal Law: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Over-Criminalization Task Force, 113th Cong. 7 
(2013) [hereinafter The Need for a Meaningful Intent] (written statement of Norman L. Reimer, 
Executive Director, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL)) (citation 
omitted), http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/113th/07192013/Reimer%2007192013.pdf. 
 14. See infra Part I.D. (discussing the MPC’s default mens rea provision). 
 15. See, e.g., Barker, supra note 12; Marc A. Levin, At the State Level, So-Called Crimes Are 
Here, There, Everywhere, 28 CRIM. JUST. 4 (2013); Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization 
Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703 (2005); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Playing With The Rules: An 
Effort To Strengthen The Mens Rea Standards of Federal Criminal Laws, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 
685 (2011); Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
537 (2012). 
 16. See supra note 13. 
 17. Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary, House Judiciary 
Committee Creates Bipartisan Task Force on Over-Criminalization (May 5, 2013), 
http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/2013/5/housejudiciarycommitteecreatesbipartisantaskforceo
novercriminalization. 
 18. See WALSH & JOSLYN, supra note 13, at 27–30.  This Comment will evaluate the first 
two recommendations—a default mens rea rule and codifying the rule of lenity—because they will 
1000 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 63:997 
This Comment will first explore the issue of mens rea at the federal level and 
the federal courts understanding of mens rea in federal criminal offenses.  Next, 
the Comment will discuss the federal courts’ interpretation and use of the rule 
of lenity to interpret statutes that are silent as to mens rea for an offense.  Further, 
this Comment will review the MPC’s default mens rea provisions and the 
application of these provisions in various states.  The Comment will analyze two 
proposed recommendations from various organizations that urge Congress to 
enact legislation that would codify the rule of lenity and enact some form of a 
default mens rea provision.  Finally, this Comment will propose the appropriate 
language for a federal default mens rea provision. 
I.  MENS REA: A CRITICAL MATERIAL ELEMENT SOMETIMES NEGLECTED 
A.  Intent: The “essential element of a crime”19 
To be held liable for a crime, one must have committed the physical 
components (actus rei) combined with the particular state of mind required for 
the wrongful act (mens rea).20  Generally, a defendant will not be found guilty 
for an offense if he or she did not have the requisite mental state required by the 
common law or the statute.21  Justice Robert Jackson described the necessity of 
mens rea as no “provincial or transient notion,” and stated that “an injury can 
amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention” and that it was the “duty of 
the normal individual to choose between good and evil.”22 
Nearly every state codified common law crimes and, when those statutes 
omitted the intent requirement, the general presumption was that the requisite 
intent was so obvious that it was unnecessary to expend additional words in the 
language of the statute specifically addressing intent.23  At the federal level, 
there is no criminal code per se, but most of the criminal statutes are codified 
                                                        
have a greater and more immediate impact on addressing overcriminalization at the federal level.  
The institutional reforms in Congress will only deter or limit the future codification of criminal 
offenses or penalties. 
 19. RONALD A. ANDERSON, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 60 (1957). 
 20. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 41 (9th ed. 2009).  Mens rea is Latin for a guilty mind.  Id. 
at 1075.  It is the mental state the defendant must have had at the time when committing the “social 
harm” or actus rei elements defined in the offense.  DRESSLER, supra note 6, at 150. 
 21. DRESSLER, supra note 6, at 150. 
 22. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952). 
 23. Id. at 252 (observing that when “state[s] codified the common law of crimes, even if their 
enactments were silent on the subject, their courts assumed that the omission did not signify 
disapproval of the principle but merely recognized that intent was so inherent in the idea of the 
offense that it required no statutory affirmation”). 
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under Title 18 of the United States Code.24  Federal criminal offenses are “solely 
creatures of statute” and it is Congress’ province to define each element.25 
Congress often neglects to include an intent requirement when codifying a 
common law offense or creating a new criminal offense.26  When determining 
the mental state of a federal crime, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
“construction of the statute and of inference of the intent of Congress” is 
required.27  In Morissette v. United States, a World War II veteran and scrap iron 
collector was convicted of knowingly converting spent bomb casings that were 
technically U.S. military property. 28   Morissette loaded, crushed, and 
transported the spent casings without attempting to conceal his actions.29  When 
the government opened an investigation, he voluntarily told his story and 
admitted everything, claiming that he had no intention of stealing and genuinely 
believed the spent casings were abandoned property.30  He was subsequently 
convicted and appealed on the grounds that he did not have the requisite criminal 
intent to be convicted.31  The appellate court found that this particular federal 
offense required no element of criminal intent because Congress failed to 
include it in the statute.32  The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, unless 
specified by Congress, when Congress passes an act “merely adopting into 
federal statutory law a concept of crime already so well defined in common law” 
it “presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached” to the 
common law offense.33 
                                                        
 24. See Moohr, supra note 15, at 687 (labeling Title 18 “the nominal federal criminal code”).  
Congressman Robert C. “Bobby” Scott, the ranking member of the Over-Criminalization Task 
Force, has observed that the federal criminal code “is neither thoughtful nor is it organized in a way 
that gives citizens fair notice of which behavior is lawful and which might land them in jail.”  
Criminal Code Reform: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Over-Criminalization Task 
Force, 113th Cong. 3 (2014) (statement of Rep. Robert C. “Bobby” Scott, Member, H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary). 
 25. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985) (citing United States v. Hudson & 
Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812)). 
 26. See Luna, supra note 15, at 708. 
 27. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 253 (1922).  Where Congressional intent is crystal 
clear, the Court has recognized there is very little room for either a court or an administrative or 
regulatory agency to interpret legislative intent.  See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of 
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed 
intent of Congress.”). 
 28. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 247–48. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 248. 
 31. Id. at 248–49. 
 32. Id. at 250. 
 33. Id. at 262–63.  Justice Jackson further stated that when Congress codifies a common law 
offense, the silence as to mens rea “may warrant quite contrary inferences than the same silence in 
creating an offence new to general law, for whose definition the courts have no guidance except 
the Act.”  Id. at 262. 
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B.  Non-Common Law Federal Offenses and Mens Rea—Sometimes an 
Afterthought? 
For non-common law offenses, the Supreme Court has stated that generally 
“a defendant must know the facts that make his conduct illegal.”34  In Staples v. 
United States, a man was convicted of unlawful possession of an unregistered 
machine gun in violation of the National Firearms Act.35  The defendant claimed 
he had no idea that his AR-15 rifle, a semiautomatic weapon, which did not need 
to be registered pursuant to the National Firearms Act, had been modified to fire 
automatically.36  The modification made the rifle an automatic weapon or a 
machine gun as defined by the law and thus it required registration.37  The 
offense statute was “silent concerning the mens rea required for a violation.”38  
The Court held that “absent a clear statement from Congress that mens rea is not 
required” it would not “interpret any statute defining a felony offense as 
dispensing with mens rea.”39 
In United States v. United States Gypsum Co., the Supreme Court affirmed 
that the state must prove mens rea in order to convict an individual of 
committing a crime.40  Gypsum, in part, concerned whether there was a mens rea 
requirement in a criminal antitrust offense under the Sherman Antitrust Act.41  
The federal government charged the Gypsum Company, a manufacturer of a 
laminated type of wallboard, with conspiracy to fix prices in violation of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act.42  The defendants challenged the jury instructions, which 
charged that “if the effect of the exchanges of pricing information was to raise, 
fix, maintain, and stabilize prices, then the parties to them are presumed, as a 
matter of law, to have intended that result.”43  The Supreme Court held that a 
“defendant’s state of mind or intent is an element of a criminal antitrust offense 
which must be established by evidence and inferences drawn therefrom and 
                                                        
 34. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994).  The Court qualified this for cases 
where “dispensing with mens rea would require the defendant to have knowledge only of 
traditionally lawful conduct, a severe penalty is a further factor tending to suggest that Congress 
did not intend to eliminate a mens rea requirement.”  Id. at 618–19. 
 35. Id. at 603–04. 
 36. Id. at 603. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 605. 
 39. Id. at 618. 
 40. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978) (stating that “[t]he 
existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American 
criminal jurisprudence” (alteration in the original) (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 
500 (1951)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 41. Id. at 426. 
 42. Id. at 426–27. 
 43. Id. at 434.  The government argued that this jury instruction was consistent with previous 
Supreme Court decisions holding that an agreement by sellers to share pricing information violates 
the Sherman Antitrust Act if such an agreement has either the purpose or the effect of price 
stabilization.  Id. at 435. 
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cannot be taken from the trier of fact through reliance on a legal presumption of 
wrongful intent from proof of an effect on prices.”44  Further, the Court stated 
that Congress would need to do “far more than the simple omission” of an intent 
requirement in order to dispense with mens rea.45 
The Supreme Court’s holdings in Morissette, Gypsum, and Staples stand for 
the rule that mens rea should only be dispensed in limited circumstances or when 
expressly dispatched by Congress.  As a result, much uncertainty remains as to 
when a law-abiding citizen becomes a criminal. 
C.  The Rule of Lenity and Ambiguity in the Law—Sometimes a Defendant’s 
Only Defense 
The common law rule of lenity “requires ambiguous criminal laws to be 
interpreted in favor of the defendants subjected to them.”46  The rule expresses 
an important principal in criminal law that no one should be punished for 
violating an ambiguous statute whose commands or prohibitions are unclear.47  
The rule also encourages legislatures to be clear when enacting criminal offenses 
or penalties to ensure that courts do not take it upon themselves to provide their 
own visions of clarity.48  This has the added benefit that courts are not taking it 
upon themselves to expand or change statutes without the direct consent of the 
people’s elected representatives.49 
In United States v. Santos, the Supreme Court applied the rule of lenity in 
interpreting a federal money laundering statute.50  The defendant operated a 
lottery and employed several individuals who collected bets from gamblers, 
received a commission, and delivered the rest of the money collected to the 
defendant. 51   The defendant challenged his conviction, contending that the 
                                                        
 44. Id. at 435. 
 45. Id. at 438. 
 46. United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008); see also United States v. Gradwell, 
243 U.S. 476, 485 (1917) (observing that “before a man can be punished as a criminal under the 
federal law his case must be ‘plainly and unmistakably’ within the provisions of some statute 
(quoting United States v. Lacher, 134 U.S. 624, 628 (1890))); McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 
25, 27 (1931) (stating that “[a]lthough it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text 
of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the 
world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain 
line is passed”); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347–49 (1971) (arguing that ambiguities in 
criminal statutes “should be resolved in favor of lenity” and the legislatures, not the courts should 
determine what is criminal because “criminal punishment usually represents the moral 
condemnation of the community” (quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)). 
 47. Santos, 553 U.S. at 514. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id.; see also Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 885, 916–17 (2004) (discussing the impact of the rule of lenity on the legislatures and the 
electorate). 
 50. Santos, 553 U.S. at 513–14. 
 51. Id. at 509. 
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money collected was receipts and not profits.52  The issue before the Court was 
whether “criminal proceeds” in the federal money laundering statute means 
“receipts” or “profits.”53  Searching for a precise meaning, the Court determined 
that the ordinary meaning of “proceeds” can include both “profits” and 
“receipts.”54  Further frustrating matters, the Court also found that Congress 
defined the term in other criminal provisions to mean either “profits” or 
“receipts.”55   The Court held that such an interpretive tie must benefit the 
defendant, because of the Court’s findings of ambiguity regarding the use of the 
word elsewhere in the same statute.56 
In United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., a tax levied under the 
National Fire Arms Act, which carried criminal penalties for failing to comply 
with the Act’s provisions and imposed such penalties without proof of 
willfulness or knowledge, was challenged on the basis of ambiguity. 57  
Specifically, the defendant challenged what it meant to “make” a firearm 
covered under the Act.58  The defendant manufactured pistols, which were not a 
covered category of firearms, and packaged the pistols with conversion kits.59   
The kits allowed consumers to convert the pistols into short-barrel rifles, which 
were a covered category of firearms.60  The Court stated that it was necessary to 
invoke the rule of lenity because the statute “has criminal applications that carry 
no additional requirement of willfulness.”61 
In Ratzlaf v. United States, the Court used the rule of lenity to read a mens rea 
requirement into a federal statute requiring banks to file reports with the 
Secretary of Treasury if the bank is involved in a cash transaction exceeding 
$10,000.62  The statute also made it illegal to structure such transactions in order 
to avoid the reporting threshold.63  The defendant, needing to pay a Nevada 
casino $100,000 for a gambling debt, was charged with “structuring 
transactions” in violation of the Act for purchasing $100,000 total in cashier’s 
                                                        
 52. Id.  The defendant based his position on the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the money laundering statute, aruing that the law’s “prohibition 
of transactions involving criminal ‘proceeds’ applies only to transactions involving criminal profits, 
not criminal receipts.”  Id. at 510 (citing United States v. Scialabba, 282 F.3d 475, 478 (7th Cir. 
2002)). 
 53. Id. at 515. 
 54. Id. at 511. 
 55. Id. at 511–12. 
 56. Id. at 514. 
 57. United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 507–08, 517 (1992). 
 58. Id. at 508, 517. 
 59. Id. at 508.  
 60. Id.  The same conversion kit could also be used to convert the pistol into a long-barrel 
rifle, which was also not covered by the statute. See id. at 507. 
 61. Id. at 517. 
 62. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 136–37 (1994) (explaining that the term 
“willfully” requires “something more”). 
 63. Id. at 136. 
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checks.64  Each check was just under the $10,000 reporting threshold and all of 
them were purchased from several different banks.65  The trial court instructed 
the jury “that the Government had to prove [the] defendant’s knowledge of the 
banks’ reporting obligation and his attempt to evade that obligation, but did not 
have to prove [the] defendant knew the structuring was unlawful.”66 
The defendant was found guilty and argued on appeal that his conviction for 
“willfully violating” the statute could not stand “solely on the basis of his 
knowledge that a financial institution must report currency transactions in excess 
of $10,000 and his intention to avoid such reporting.”67  Agreeing with the 
defendant, the Supreme Court held that in order to convict under the statute, “the 
jury had to find [the defendant] knew the structuring in which he engaged was 
unlawful.”68  Congress, disagreeing with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the statute, subsequently amended the law to dispense specifically with the intent 
requirement necessary to prove such a violation.69 
D.  Attacking Overcriminalization Head On: The Model Penal Code’s Default 
Mens Rea Provision 
The drafters of the MPC sought to ensure that criminal convictions could only 
be achieved by proving an intent element for each offense.70  This goal was 
achieved, in part, by adopting a default mens rea provision.71  The MPC mens 
rea provision, section 2.02(3), states that “[w]hen the culpability sufficient to 
establish a material element of an offense is not prescribed by law, such element 
is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly with respect 
thereto.”72 
Section 2.05 exempts the culpability requirements of section 2.02(3) from 
offenses resulting in nothing more than fines or other civil penalties or if the 
legislature specifically dispenses with an intent requirement.73  However, the 
                                                        
 64. Id. at 137. 
 65. Id. at 137. 
 66. Id. at 137–38. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 149. 
 69. Aversa v. United States, 99 F.3d 1200, 1205 n.4 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing the Riegle 
Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 411, 
108 Stat. 2160 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a)(2012))). 
 70. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985) (providing 
the different levels of culpability). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. § 2.02(3).  The kinds of culpability mentioned—purposely, knowingly and 
recklessly—are defined in subsection 2 of section 2.02.  Id. § 2.02(1).  The drafters commented that 
subsection 3 simply adopts the “basic norm” that had been “regarded as the common law position.”  
Id. § 2.02 cmt. 5 (Tentative Draft No. 4 1955).  The drafters specifically left out negligence as a 
default culpability because of the “exceptional basis of [such] liability” and stated that “it should 
be excluded unless explicitly prescribed.”  Id. 
 73. Id.  § 2.05 explanatory note. 
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drafters stated a preference that strict liability should be reserved for non-
criminal offenses.74  Under the MPC, “violations are not [] crimes [as defined 
by] section 1.04(5) and cannot result in a sentence of probation or 
imprisonment.”75  The drafters commented that section 2.05 is a “frontal attack 
on absolute or strict liability in the penal law, whenever the offense carries the 
possibility of criminal conviction, for which a sentence of probation or 
imprisonment may be imposed.”76 
E.  Default Mens Rea—An Effective Overcriminalization Safety Valve 
Fourteen states have adopted a mens rea provision either identical or very 
similar to the MPC’s section 2.02(3).77  Additionally, eight states have adopted 
provisions similar to both the default mens rea provision and section 2.05. 78  
These statutes require legislatures to specifically dispatch with an intent 
requirement in order to create a strict liability offense.79  The success of the 
default mens rea provision in these states varies and the application of these 
provisions is not always as consistent as the MPC’s drafters envisioned.80 
1.  Default Mens Rea as a Defense Against Strict Liability in Texas 
Texas adopted a provision similar to the MPC’s default mens rea provision.  
Section 6.02 of the Texas Penal Code provides that if an offense does not 
prescribe a culpable mental state, and the legislature has not specifically 
                                                        
 74. Id. 
 75. Id.  The Model Penal Code defines a violation as follows: 
An offense defined by this Code or by any other statute of this State constitutes a violation 
if it so designated in this Code or in the law defining the offense or if no other sentence 
than a fine, or fine and forfeiture or other civil penalty is authorized upon conviction or 
if it is defined by a statute other than this Code that now provides that the offense shall 
not constitute a crime.  A violation does not constitute a crime and conviction of a 
violation shall not give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction 
of a criminal offense. 
Id. § 1.04(5). 
 76. Id. § 2.05 cmt. 1 (footnote omitted). 
 77. See JOHN S. BAKER, JR., MENS REA AND STATE CRIMES 18–65 (2012), available at 
http://www.fed-soc.org/library/doclib/20120904_Baker2012Website.pdf (surveying the impact of 
the MPC’s mens rea provisions on state criminal codes). 
 78. Id. at 18–49.  These states are Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas, Missouri, 
Oregon, and Pennsylvania.  Id. 
 79. Id. (discussing the eight states’ statutory language and case law regarding mens rea). 
 80. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 739 P.2d 781 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); Coleman v. State, 671 
S.W.2d 221 (Ark. Ct. App. 1984); Upshur v. State, 420 A.2d. 165 (Del. 1980); State v. Whitney, 
912 P.2d 596 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996); State v. White, 28 S.W.3d 391 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000); State v. 
Eldred, 564 N.W.2d 283 (N.D. 1997); Middleburg Heights v. Bowman, No. 05-01156, 2006 WL 
3028463 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2006); State v. Turner, 953 S.W.2d 213 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). 
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dispensed with it as it relates to any material element, then “intent, knowledge, 
or recklessness suffices to establish criminal responsibility.”81 
Texas courts have shown a willingness to use the default mens rea provisions, 
except with certain offenses lacking mens rea.  In general, strict liability 
offenses, such as statutory rape and driving while intoxicated (DWI), are often 
attacked for failure to include a mens rea requirement or a lack of a specific 
dispensation of one.82  But Texas courts rarely subject these offenses to the 
default mens rea provision, even if the legislature did not specifically dispense 
with it.83  For example, in Byrne v. State, the defendant sought to have his 
statutory rape conviction overturned.84  He argued that section 6.02 imposed a 
mens rea requirement on Texas’ statutory rape law and that he did not have a 
culpable state of mind because he did not know the girl was underage.85  The 
Texas statutory rape law does not require the State to prove a culpable mental 
state with regard to the victim’s age and the legislature did not specifically 
dispense with a mens rea requirement for this material element.86  However, the 
court found that in the thirty-seven years the default mens rea provision had been 
law in Texas, courts consistently upheld strict liability sex crimes—particularly 
sex crimes committed by adults against minors—notwithstanding section 6.02.87 
Historically, with regard to other strict liability offenses, defendants charged 
with a DWI have made several attempts to set aside their convictions on the 
grounds that the DWI offense does not require a culpable mental state and the 
State should have to prove some mens rea component.88  Texas courts have 
                                                        
 81. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02(b) (West 2013).  Unlike the MPC, the Texas default mens 
rea provision refers to “intent” rather than acting “purposely.”  Id. 
 82. See Byrne v. State, 358 S.W.3d. 745, 751–52 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011) (discussing arguments 
by the defendant-appellant that his statutory rape conviction should be overturned because the state 
failed to establish a mens rea component); Chunn v. State, 923 S.W.3d 728, 729 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1996) (noting that the court did not believe the legislature intended to include a mens rea 
requirement in the DWI statute). 
 83. See cases cited supra note 82. 
 84. Byrne, 358 S.W.3d. at 747. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 752. 
 87. Id.  But see State v. Howard, 172 S.W.3d 190, 191–94 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (overturning 
a Dallas City Code violation criminalizing touching at “sexually oriented businesses” for failure to 
include a culpable mental state). 
 88. See, e.g., Palacio v. State, No. 01-95-01561-CR, 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 5857, at *2 (Tex. 
Ct. App. Oct. 30, 1997) (citing Chunn v. State, 923 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996)) (deciding 
that “the Legislature did not intend to require a culpable mental state for DWI offenses”); Sanders 
v. State, 936 S.W.2d 436, 438 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that the DWI statute did not require a 
culpable mental state even during the period of time that the offense was transferred from the civil 
statutes to the criminal code, which was before the legislature specifically exempted several 
offenses including DWI from the default mens rea provision); Pope v. State, No. 01-95-0187-CR, 
1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 4697, at *4 (Tex. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 1996) (citing Chunn, 923 S.W.2d at 
728–29) (holding that the State was not required to prove a culpable state of mind with regards to 
appellant-defendant’s challenge to his DWI); Chunn, 923 S.W.2d at 729 (holding that the Texas 
legislature clearly did not intend to require a culpable state of mind when it removed the DWI 
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generally held, without addressing the fact that the legislature did not explicitly 
dispense with mens rea, that a DWI offense did not require a culpable state of 
mind because intoxication impairs judgment.89  The courts believe that if such a 
burden was required, most intoxicated drivers would escape conviction as a 
direct result of “their diminished capacity to formulate a criminal intent.”90  
However, due to defendants using the default mens rea provision as a defense, 
the Texas legislature eventually amended the DWI offense to explicitly dispense 
with a mens rea element.91 
2.  Bear Gallbladder and Cocaine Sales—Offenses Outside Oregon’s 
Criminal Code and Default Mens Rea 
Oregon adopted provisions similar both to the MPC’s default mens rea 
provision and the MPC section 2.05, which excludes violations outside the 
state’s criminal code.92  Oregon’s default mens rea statute, contained in section 
161.115(2) of the Oregon Revised Statues, states that “if a statute defining an 
offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, culpability is nonetheless 
required and is established only if a person acts intentionally, knowingly, 
recklessly or with criminal negligence.”93  A violation exclusion similar to the 
MPC’s can be found in section 161.105, which establishes that a culpable state 
of mind is not required if the offense “constitutes a violation” or is “an offense 
defined by a statute outside the Oregon Criminal Code [and] clearly indicates a 
legislative intent to dispense with any culpable mental state requirement.”94 
Oregon courts use a straightforward approach when applying the default mens 
rea statute.95  The courts are also eager to interpret the violation exception, 
                                                        
offense from the civil statutes to the criminal code, as emphasized by the legislature’s enactment 
of a subsequent statute exempting certain offenses from section 6.02); Ex Parte Ross, 522 S.W.2d 
214, 219 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that despite the legislature’s enactment of the default mens 
rea provision, section 6.02, the legislature did not intend to require proof of a culpable mental state 
for certain offenses in the civil code including DWI). 
 89. Aguirre v. State, 928 S.W.2d 759, 760 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Sanders, 936 S.W.2d at 437. 
 92. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161.105(1)(b) (West 2013). 
 93. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161.115(2) (West 2013).  Similar to Texas, Oregon includes the 
mens rea term “intentionally” instead of the MPC’s “purposely.”  Id.  The Oregon statute is also 
broader than the MPC in that it also includes “criminal negligence” in the default mens rea 
provision.  Id.  The commentary on the proposed Oregon Criminal Code stated that the default mens 
rea provision “will do away with the problem that now often arises when a statute defining a crime 
fails to prescribe a required culpable state of mind.”  See State v. Fitch, 543 P.2d 20, 21 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1975) (applying the default mens rea provision to Oregon’s criminal trespass statute and 
reading into the statute that “a person commits the crime of criminal trespass . . . if he ‘intentionally, 
knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence’ ‘enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling’”). 
 94. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161.105(1). 
 95. See State v. Taylor, 561 P.2d 662, 663 (Or. Ct. App. 1977) (overturning a lower court’s 
dismissal of charges of driving with a suspended license for lack of the “necessary element of 
mental culpability” because the offense is statutorily defined outside the criminal code and no 
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which permits the legislature not to require mens rea for violations enacted 
outside the state’s criminal code.96 
In State v. Cho, a man “was convicted of offering to purchase the gall bladder 
of a bear” in violation of Oregon’s wildlife protection law and was fined.97  He 
was sentenced to thirty days in jail and two years of probation.98  The defendant 
challenged his conviction, arguing that the state failed to prove a culpable state 
of mind, or alternatively, that the offense was a violation, not a misdemeanor, 
and, therefore, his sentence should not have included a lengthy jail or probation 
sentence.99  The Supreme Court of Oregon, applying the violation exception in 
section 161.105, found that in order for the legislature to enact a criminal offense 
outside the state’s criminal code, the legislature must “provide[] that [the] 
offense is not a violation, and for the offense to clearly indicate a legislative 
intent to dispense with the culpable mental state requirement.”100   Because 
violation of the wildlife protection law carried a criminal penalty, the court 
stated that, pursuant to section 161.105, a culpable mental state is required unless 
the legislature specifically dispensed with the requirement.101  The court could 
not find any “indication of a legislative intent to dispense with a [mens rea 
requirement] for a breach of [the state’s] wildlife [protection] law.” 102  
Therefore, the court held that in order to commit a crime under this particular 
wildlife protection law, “a person must act with a culpable mental state.”103 
In State v. Rutley, a man was convicted of violating an Oregon statute 
criminalizing the delivery of certain controlled substances.104  In this case, the 
defendant sold cocaine to an undercover police officer within 1,000 feet of a 
school.105  The trial court held that the defendant’s knowledge of whether he was 
                                                        
mental state is required pursuant to Oregon’s default rules permitting the legislature to omit mens 
rea for violations); State v. Hash, 578 P.2d 482, 484 (Or. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that the offense 
of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon contained no express culpable mental state, 
did not meet any of the exceptions under § 161.05, and was subject to the default mens rea provision 
for each material element of the offense); State v. Gartzke, 592 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Or. Ct. App. 1979) 
(holding that the offense of criminal nonsupport of a child did not include an express culpable 
mental state and thus required application of the Oregon default mens rea provision). 
 96. See cases cited in supra note 95. 
 97. State v. Cho, 681 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Or. 1984). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 1156. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 1157. 
 103. Id.  The state argued that the intent of the legislature when enacting Oregon’s wildlife 
protection laws was to “represent a substantial government interest in the preservation of wildlife.”  
Id.  The court agreed, but failed to see how that supported the state’s contention that these laws are 
strict liability crimes and held that a substantial state interest in the preservation of wildlife cannot 
substitute for the need for clear legislative intent to dispense with a mens rea requirement for a 
breach of these laws.  Id. 
 104. State v. Rutley, 171 P.3d 361, 361 (Or. 2007). 
 105. Id. 
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within 1,000 feet of a school was not a necessary element.106  However, the court 
of appeals disagreed and held that proving knowledge would be necessary to 
convict.107  The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that while the offense 
was enacted outside the criminal code, the legislature clearly intended “to give 
drug dealers a reason to locate the 1,000-foot school boundary and stay outside 
it—by punishing the failure to do so as the most serious of crimes.”108  Oregon’s 
Supreme Court further concluded that the omission of mens rea for the attendant 
circumstances that would bring the defendant within this offense was obviously 
“purposeful” on the part of the legislature.109  The court found that the legislature 
clearly indicated its intent to dispense with mens rea.110 
3.  Securities Fraud and Cutting Too Much Timber Without Consent—
Default Mens Rea in Illinois 
Illinois also adopted a provision similar to the MPC’s default provision and 
has developed a fairly consistent approach to its application.111  Section 4-3 of 
the Illinois Criminal Code states that an individual “is not guilty of an offense, 
other than an offense which involves absolute liability, unless, with respect to 
each element described by the statute defining the offense, he acts while having 
one of the mental states” of intent, knowledge, or recklessness.112 
In People v. Whitlow, the defendants were charged and convicted of twelve 
counts of conspiracy, theft, and other violations of Illinois Securities Law.113  
The defendants challenged their convictions based on the statutory silence 
regarding the culpable mental state in the various sections of the Securities 
Law.114  The Illinois Supreme Court noted that the securities law provisions at 
issue were silent as to whether a culpable state of mind was necessary to 
                                                        
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 361–62. 
 108. Id.  at 365.  The court further commented that “requiring a knowing mental state with 
regard to the distance element would work against the obvious legislative purpose, in that it would 
create an incentive for drug deals not to identify schools, and not to take into consideration their 
distance from them in engaging in their illegal activity.”  Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id.  The court also commented that “no mental state is logically required for a distance 
element.”  Id. 
 111. See People v. Leach, 279 N.E.2d. 450, 452 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972) (holding that the default 
mens rea statute required the state to prove a culpable state of mind because mob action is an 
offense punishable by incarceration and there was no clear legislative intent to impose absolute 
liability); see also People v. Abdul-Mutkabbir, 692 N.E.2d 756, 759 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (holding 
that the offense of falsely representing oneself as a licensed attorney is not an absolute liability 
offense and because the legislature did not state a required mental state of culpability and provided 
no language to explicitly dispense with mens rea, the default mens rea provision must apply). 
 112. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-3 (West 2013).  This section of the Illinois statute 
references the sections that define the mental states rather than listing the three separately.  Id. 
 113. People v. Whitlow, 433 N.E.2d. 629, 631 (Ill. 1982). 
 114. Id. at 633. 
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convict.115  Applying the default mens rea provision, the court stated that if the 
charged provisions of the Securities Act were not absolute liability offenses, then 
a culpable mental state was required.116 
In People v. Langford, the defendant was charged with a Class 4 felony 
violation of the Timber Buyers Licensing Act for cutting and appropriating 
timber without the consent of the timber grower.117  The defendant pleaded 
guilty to a misdemeanor offense under the same Act.118  The trial court imposed 
the maximum sentence, ordering the defendant to serve one year in county 
jail.119  The defendant unsuccessfully moved to have his guilty plea withdrawn 
arguing that the state “failed to allege a mental state.”120  The appellate court 
reversed holding that the Act did not include a culpable mental state and that it 
was not an absolute liability offense as argued by the state.121  The appellate 
court stated that “[a]bsolute liability cannot be imposed for an offense for which 
the offender may be jailed unless the legislature clearly indicated its intent to 
require that result.”122  The court could not find any support in the text of the 
Act or its legislative history for the contention that the offense was an absolute 
liability offense.123 
III.  RULE OF LENITY VS. THE MODEL PENAL CODE: WHICH APPROACH IS 
MOST EFFECTIVE TO STOP OVERCRIMINALIZATION? 
A.  The Rule of Lenity is Insufficient in Its Case-By-Case Application 
Advocates for reform have urged that codifying the common law rule of lenity 
“would reduce the risk of injustice stemming from criminal offenses that lack 
clarity or specificity.”124  The Supreme Court has shown that it is not shy in 
applying the rule when statutes are ambiguous or vague.125 
                                                        
 115. Id. at 633. 
 116. Id. at 633–34. In determining which of the four default mental states to apply, the court 
looked at the federal Securities Act of 1933, which is very similar to the Illinois Securities Act.  Id.  
However, the federal securities law requires a person to have acted “willfully.”  Id. at 633–34.  The 
court ultimately determined that “knowing” was most analogous, adopting reasoning from the U.S. 
Supreme Court that the essential elements of securities offenses require a mental state that 
“embraces intentional or knowing misconduct.” Id. at 634. 
 117. People v. Langford, 552 N.E.2d 274, 275 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 276. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. WALSH & JOSLYN, supra note 13, at 28.  Walsh and Joslyn state that “[t]he rule of lenity 
directs a court, when construing an ambiguous criminal law, to resolve the ambiguity in favor of 
the defendant.  Adding the rule of lenity to federal law would serve the rights of all defendants at 
every stage of the criminal process.”  Id. 
 125. See supra notes 46–69 and accompanying text. 
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Santos and Thompson/Arms both illustrate the application of this approach, 
because they address an ambiguity with a particular word or clarify the mens rea 
element in a statute.126  Advocates for codification of the rule of lenity correctly 
argue that the Supreme Court’s use of the rule “is consistent with the traditional 
rules that all defendants are presumed innocent and that the government bears 
the burden of proving every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”127 
Further, the Court’s use of the rule of lenity in favor of the criminally accused 
will force Congress to review already enacted criminal offenses in light of the 
Court’s interpretation, which will compel debates and votes on either a fix or a 
clarification of Congress’ original intent. 128   The ultimate goal of many 
advocates is for Congress, and legislatures generally, to review the criminal 
offenses codified and to clarify their intent when the average citizen, and her 
lawyer, are left dumbfounded that she has been charged with a crime that she 
had no idea she committed.129 
As seen in Ratzlaf, the Supreme Court used the rule of lenity to read a mens 
rea requirement into a monetary reporting and anti-structuring of transactions 
statute with criminal penalties in favor of the defendant.130  The defendant was 
aware of the reporting requirements for large transactions, but unaware that 
structuring payments to avoid the reporting threshold was in contravention of 
the law.131  Congress, disagreeing with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
statute, acted swiftly to amend the law clarifying that no mens rea was required 
to prove a violation of structuring payments to avoid the reporting threshold.132  
                                                        
 126. See United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008); United States v. Thompson/Center 
Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 508 (1992). 
 127. WALSH & JOSLYN, supra note 13, at 28.  Walsh and Joslyn point out that the Supreme 
Court has called the rule of lenity “a fundamental rule of statutory construction.”  Id.  In United 
States v. Bass, the Court referred to the rule as a “wise principle[] this court has long followed.”  
404 U.S. 335, 347 (1971).  Nevertheless, Walsh and Joslyn state that: 
[d]espite the Supreme Court’s statements, the rule has not been uniformly or consistently 
applied by the lower federal courts, and adding it to federal law would serve the rights of 
all defendants at every stage of the criminal process, not just those who have the means 
and opportunity to successfully appeal their convictions to the Supreme Court. 
WALSH & JOSLYN, supra note 13, at 28. 
 128. WALSH & JOSLYN, supra note 13, at 28; see also Price, supra note 49 at 915–16 
(examining the impact of the judiciary’s use of the rule of lenity on the legislative and executive 
branches). 
 129. See id. at 29 (discussing the benefits of compelling Congress to draft “mens rea 
requirements that are no broader than necessary to allow conviction of only those who are truly 
culpable or blameworthy”); see also Price, supra note 49 at 916–17 (stating that “[t]he rule of lenity 
ensures that legislators must take [a] more exacting path” when drafting legislation that criminalizes 
conduct). 
 130. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137–38 (1994). 
 131. Id.  The Court reiterated “the venerable principle that ignorance of the law generally is no 
defense to a criminal charge.”  Id. at 149. However, in order to convict Ratzlaf, “the jury had to 
find [the defendant] knew the structuring in which he engaged was unlawful.”  Id. 
 132. Courtney J. Linn, Redefining the Bank Secrecy Act: Currency Reporting and the Crime 
of Structuring, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 407, 510–11 (2010) (stating that “[w]hen Congress 
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Although Congress’ amendment to the law was contrary to the view that mens 
rea should generally be required when criminal sanctions are applied, Ratzlaf at 
least made Congress aware that it was not being clear enough when it drafted 
the statute.133 
The pitfall of the rule of lenity is that it is often a court’s last resort when 
interpreting the statutory language of an offense.134  Courts traditionally first 
consider each and every aspect of the statute at issue, how its text relates to other 
provisions, and then determine the intention of the legislature.135  The logical 
analysis is to look for the plain meaning first, and then delve into the legislative 
history of a statute.  However, in his plurality opinion in United States v. Santos, 
Justice Scalia advocated for dispensing of the legislative history inquiry and 
determining immediately whether a statute is on its face ambiguous and then 
applying the rule of lenity.136  Granted in instances where mental culpability is 
at question in a criminal offense, such an application of the rule of lenity may be 
appropriate.137   Ultimately, a codified rule of lenity may not be enough to 
distract courts from the traditional avenues of statutory interpretation and will 
likely only be applied for the most ambiguous of statutes on a case-by-case basis. 
B.  The Model Penal Code’s Default Mens Rea Provision Has Helped Stem the 
Tide of Overcriminalization at the State Level When Properly Applied 
The Model Penal Code’s default mens rea provisions are stemming the tide 
of overcriminalization at the state level in states that have adopted these 
provisions but not necessarily at the expense of overturning commonly accepted 
strict liability offenses.  Advocates for reform argue that enacting a default mens 
rea statute at the federal level “would help law-abiding individuals know in 
advance which criminal offenses carry an unavoidable risk of criminal 
punishment and safeguard against unintentional legislative omissions of mens 
rea requirements.”138  Additionally, advocates point out that Congress, like state 
legislatures that have adopted the default rule, “would remain free to enact strict 
                                                        
overruled Ratzlaf and relaxed the mens rea elements of the structuring offense, it increased the 
danger that the structuring statute could be misused” (emphasis added)). 
 133. See id. (discussing Congress’ reaction to the Ratzlaf decision). 
 134. United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 513 (2008) (explaining the Court’s application of 
the rule of lenity); see also Price, supra note 49, at 890–91 (analyzing the rule of lenity’s place in 
the statutory interpretation hierarchy). 
 135. Price, supra note 49, at 890–91. 
 136. Santos, 553 U.S. at 513–14. 
 137. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952). 
 138. WALSH & JOSLYN, supra note 13, at 27.  The report’s authors state that enacting a default 
mens rea provision is “perhaps the most straightforward and effective reform.”  Id.  A federal 
default mens rea provision “would greatly reduce the disparities that exist among the federal courts 
in the interpretation and application of mens rea requirements, and thereby result in the fairer, more 
consistent application of federal criminal laws.”  Id. at 27. 
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liability offenses even after this reform is implemented, but to do so, it would 
have to make its purpose clear in the express language of the statute.”139 
States that have adopted similar or identical provisions to the MPC’s default 
rules preserve the legislature’s ability to enact strict liability offenses without 
expressly dispatching mens rea for certain offenses.  Several cases interpreting 
Texas’ default mens rea provision involved defendants’ failed attempts to attack 
common strict liability offenses, such as statutory rape and driving while 
intoxicated.140  For instance, in Byrne v. State, the Texas Court of Appeals 
dismissed an attempt to require the state to prove that the defendant had actual 
knowledge that the girl involved was underage.141  The court based its holding 
on the fact that no court in Texas had ever applied the default provision to the 
offense of statutory rape in the decades following the adoption of the default 
provision, rather than whether the state legislature specifically dispatched a 
culpable mental state element.142  When asked to apply the default rules to a 
DWI offense, which lacked a specific mens rea requirement and no specific 
language dispensing it, Texas courts declined to apply the default mens rea 
provision because requiring a culpable state of mind for DWI would make the 
offense meaningless given that intoxication impairs judgment. 143   This 
application is logical because, if the court required the government to prove that 
the intoxicated individual drove while intoxicated purposely, knowingly, or at 
least recklessly, then the accused would be allowed to get off by simply 
testifying: “I had no idea I was too drunk to drive.”144 
For the types of regulatory offenses that may carry a criminal penalty, the 
MPC’s default mens rea rules have proven to be an effective tool to protect those 
without a morally blameworthy state of mind.145  This was effectively the case 
in State v. Cho, where the defendant was convicted of violating Oregon’s 
wildlife protection laws by attempting to purchase a bear gallbladder.146  The 
Oregon Supreme Court used the state’s default provisions almost exactly as 
envisioned by the drafters of the MPC for such an offense.147  Finding that the 
Oregon legislature had not specifically dispatched with mens rea and that the 
criminal offense was outside the criminal code, the court held that the legislature 
would have to specifically make the offense a strict liability offense if that was 
                                                        
 139. Id.  Other than highlighting the relevant provisions of the MPC, Walsh and Joslyn do not 
propose what a federal default mens rea provision would look like exactly. 
 140. See supra Part I.E.1. 
 141. Byrne v. State, 358 S.W.3d. 745, 747 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011). 
 142. Byrne, 358 S.W.3d. at 749–50. 
 143. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 144. See Florance v. State, No. 05-08-00707-CR, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 3188, at *12–14 
(Tex. Ct. App. May 8, 2009) (concluding that the legislature intended to dispense with mens rea 
for the offense of drinking while underage despite neglecting to do so specifically). 
 145. See supra Part I.D. 
 146. State v. Cho, 681 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Or. 1984). 
 147. See id. at 1156–57; see also supra notes 70–76 and accompanying text. 
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the legislature’s intent.148  Because the legislature had failed to do so, applying 
the default mens rea provision was necessary.149  Such an application by federal 
courts to the numerous regulatory offenses that carry criminal penalties could 
prevent the type of public welfare offenses that are too obscure to not require 
mens rea.  Generally, the states that have enacted a default mens rea provision 
use it to draw a bright line between offenses that do not carry a criminal sanction 
and those that do.150 
IV.  THE MODEL PENAL CODE’S DEFAULT MENS REA PROVISION IS THE BEST 
CURE FOR THE AILS OF OVERCRIMINALIZATION AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL 
A default mens rea provision may not be as clear-cut or easy to draft at the 
federal level, but nevertheless it may be a more effective approach to solving the 
problem of federal overcriminalization.151  Codification of the rule of lenity may 
be a good supplemental safeguard, but courts should not be so quick to dispense 
with legislative intent, especially if the legislative history can help the court 
reach a reasonable meaning.152 
An issue with creating a default mens rea provision is that the exact wording 
in the MPC may not work well at the federal level.153  Congress would have to 
determine which mens rea term or terms should be the default.154  Additionally, 
Congress would also need to determine the precise meaning of the chosen 
default term.155  Congress generally includes an intent element of “knowingly,” 
which the Supreme Court has interpreted to only mean “requir[ing] proof of 
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.”156  Congress sometimes also 
                                                        
 148. Cho, 681 P.2d at 1156. 
 149. Id. at 1157. 
 150. See supra Part I.E. 
 151. Moohr, supra note 15, at 704.  Moohr also comments that “[t]raditionally, courts find 
ambiguity only after first using other interpretive devices to divine Congress’s intent in enacting 
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exhausting every other statutory interpretive tool.  Id. at 709. 
 152. See Moohr, supra note 15, at 709.  Justice Souter has indicated that the Court will use the 
rule of lenity after exhausting other factors that help determine the legislative intent.  Id. 
 153. This primarily stems from the differences and inconsistency in terminology of mens rea 
terms throughout the U.S. Code. See The Need for a Meaningful Intent, supra note 13, at 10–11 
(statement of Dr. John S. Baker, Jr., Visiting Professor, Georgetown Law School; Professor 
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 155. Moohr, supra note 15, at 702–03. 
 156. Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (quoting Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 
184, 193 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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uses the term “willfully,” which generally also requires a showing that the 
defendant “acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.”157  However, 
some advocates for reform suggest that if Congress were to adopt a default mens 
rea provision, it should use the mens rea term “willfully” because it is more 
universally understood.158  Additionally, a default mens rea requirement may 
give federal prosecutors pause before overzealously prosecuting people based 
on federal laws lacking mens rea that allow for easier convictions.159 
A federal default mens rea provision may have very well saved Wade Martin, 
the Alaskan Native, discussed at the beginning of this Comment, who 
unknowingly violated the federal Mammal Protection Act, from criminal 
prosecution. 160   Martin was aware of his obligations under the law, which 
prohibited the sale to non-natives, and understood that the Alaskan native 
exception only applied to sales between Alaskan natives. 161   If the federal 
government had been required to prove that Martin either “knowingly” or 
“willfully” sold sea otters to a non-native, federal prosecutors may have relented 
in their pursuit of criminal charges against Martin.  It would have been more 
appropriate in Martin’s case to simply fine him for the violation thus putting him 
on notice to better verify his patrons.  A default mens rea provision likely would 
have prevented the criminalization of such an allegedly honest mistake. 
Congress and state legislatures have shown that they are not shy about 
overturning a court’s decision when it contradicts what the legislatures perceived 
to be the legislatures’ original intent.162  A default provision may force Congress 
to carefully consider and draft new criminal offenses if Congress knows that 
failure to either specifically make the new offense strict liability, or explain why 
                                                        
 157. Id. (quoting Bryan, 524 U.S. at 193) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 158. The Need for a Meaningful Intent, supra note 13, at 7 n.12 (written statement of Norman 
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 159. The Need for a Meaningful Intent, supra note 13, at 7–9 (statement of Dr. John S. Baker, 
Jr., Visiting Professor, Georgetown Law School; Professor Emeritus, LSU Law School).  In his 
testimony, Baker cited the federal prosecutorial power under the federal Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 
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many advocates for reform argue that “[i]nnocent individuals must rely on Congress to represent 
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 160. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text. 
 161. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text. 
 162. See supra notes 62–69 and accompanying text. 
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no mens rea should be required, will subject the new offenses to the default 
provisions.  As the Supreme Court stated in Staples, “absent a clear statement 
from Congress that mens rea is not required,” it would not “interpret any statute 
defining a felony offense as dispensing with mens rea.”163  A culpable state of 
mind is a key requisite of a criminal offense and Congress should always try to 
better justify its actions when it muddles the contours of mens rea or it fails to 
even specify the mens rea when Congress enacts new offenses.164 
A.  Federal Default Mens Rea Provision—a Proposal 
A federal default mens rea provision would have to differ substantially from 
the provision in the MPC.165  Section 2.02(3) of the MPC states: “When the 
culpability sufficient to establish a material element of an offense is not 
prescribed by law, such element is established if a person acts purposefully, 
knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto.”166 
A federal default mens rea provision should adopt “willfully” as the default 
term.167  While the Supreme Court has stated that “willfully” is “a word of many 
meanings” and its use is usually dependent on the context in which it is used,168  
the Court stated that at a minimum, in criminal law, “a ‘willful’ act is one 
undertaken with a ‘bad purpose.’” 169   Drawing from Supreme Court 
jurisprudence and academic conjecture, a sufficient definition of “willfully” for 
purposes of a federal default mens rea provision could be: An individual acts 
“willfully” when acting with knowledge that the action or conduct is prohibited 
by law.170 
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 164. See supra Part I.A. 
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A federal default mens rea provision should include specific language that 
directs judges and federal prosecutors to apply the default provision. 171  
Additionally, it should be required that the default mens rea provision be applied 
to criminal sanctions, outside of Title 18, lacking a mens rea unless specifically 
dispensed with by Congress. 172   This application would help curtail strict 
liability offenses and would force Congress to review such offenses on a case-
by-case basis to decide whether to dispense with mens rea.173 
Combining the MPC’s approach, the proposed definition of “willfully,” and 
what many advocates agree a federal default provision would require to be 
effective, a proposed federal default mens rea provision may look like the 
following: 
Sec. XXX Default Culpability 
(1) Definition of Default Mental State—For the purposes of default 
culpability, an individual acts ‘willfully’ when acting with knowledge 
that the action or conduct is prohibited by law. 
(2) Applicability within this Title—When the culpability sufficient to 
establish a material element of an offense is not prescribed by a 
provision establishing a criminal offense within this title, such element 
is established if a person acts willfully with respect thereto. 
(3) Applicability outside this Title—When the culpability sufficient to 
establish a material element of an offense carrying a criminal penalty 
is not prescribed by a provision outside of this title for an offense 
established outside of this title, such element is established if a person 
acts willfully with respect thereto unless explicit legislative intent to 
dispense with any culpable mental state requirement is provided for 
within the section establishing the offense. 
The proposed language in subsection 2 makes only minor adjustments to the 
draft language of the MPC’s default mens rea provision but it should be effective 
at the federal level.174  The language of subsection 2 does not necessarily apply 
to the numerous offenses within Title 18 that contain no mens rea requirement.  
Additionally, the language, if adopted, would require the default mens rea 
                                                        
 171. See WALSH & JOSLYN, supra note 13, at 27 (stating that such a provision would “grant a 
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element to be read into any offense in Title 18 that prescribes no mens rea.  This 
option is in line with the recommendations of many advocates for reform, but 
could lead to problems initially.175  For example, it is possible that someone 
might challenge the federal statutory rape offense as a strict liability crime.176  
Congress could, however, add language specifically exempting these strict 
liability offenses within Title 18 from the application of the default mens rea 
provision.177 
Subsection 3 simply requires that Congress explicitly acknowledge that it did 
not intend to require a mens rea element when it enacts certain regulatory 
criminal offenses outside of Title 18.  The language of subsection 3 attacks the 
crux of the federal overcriminalization problem—criminal sanctions for 
regulatory offenses outside of Title 18, such as the criminal penalty contained 
within the Mammal Protection Act.178  In order to enact a strict liability offense 
outside of Title 18, Congress would specifically have to dispense with the mens 
rea element.  If Congress failed to do so, the default mens rea provision would 
kick in and hopefully deter unnecessary criminal prosecutions of individuals 
who did not “willfully” break the law. 
Congress will ultimately have to determine the best legislative language to 
enact, but it is clear that a default mens rea provision will be a key reform to 
address federal overcriminalization.  Backing for a federal default mens rea 
provision is gaining support among key members of both parties on the House 
Over-Criminalization Task Force, including the Chairman of the House 
Judiciary Committee.179  However, as experts on the issue have pointed out, it 
will be difficult to draft a default mens rea provision that can work with federal 
criminal law, as well as the numerous related regulatory offenses.180 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The prevalence of overcriminalization at the federal level remains a 
significant issue.  Reforms have been proposed and it is incumbent on Congress 
to act.181  Enacting a default mens rea provision at the federal level, while it may 
have shortcomings, will be the most effective method to resolve the problem. 
Overcriminalization at the state level appears to be less rampant where states 
have adopted the default mens rea provisions of the MPC.  Default provisions 
will protect those without a guilty mind from being convicted as criminals.  
Additionally, they will have the added benefit of forcing Congress to draft new 
criminal offenses carefully if it does not want the offense to fall within the 
confines of the default provisions. 
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